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An explanation of the independence of irrelevant alternatives criterion (IIA). If x wins and y does not, changing preferences with respect to other candidate...
In voting systems, independence of irrelevant alternatives is the property some voting systems have that, if one option (X) wins the election, and a new alternative (Y) is added, only X or Y will win the election.
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This paper aims to reexamine the axiom of the independence of irrelevant alternatives in the theory of social choice. A generalized notion of independence
Downloadable (with restrictions)! Abstract Since the publication of Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow’s independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom has drawn criticism for being too strong a requirement of a collective choice rule. In this article, we detail and counter some of the criticisms. We present two axioms (one cardinal and one ordinal) that are equivalent to Arrow’s IIA, discuss an implication of IIA for transitive social choice, and argue that violations of IIA do indeed constitute a perversity. We claim that violations of IIA are particularly troubling in contexts where many alternatives are considered simultaneously, good information is available about the ranking of each alternative with respect to each criterion being aggregated, final decisions can be scrutinized and revisited, and/or the correlation between how the various criteria rank alternatives is low. While a mass election is precisely a decision-making scenario that satisfies none of these conditions, we argue that the normative appeal of IIA is maximized for aggregation problems that can be revisited and revised, and that involve objective and varying criteria (e.g., routine administrative and judicial decisions).
Independence of irrelevant alternatives - Wikipedia
The independence of irrelevant alternatives , also known as binary independence or the independence axiom, is an axiom of decision theory and various social sciences. The term is used with different meanings in different contexts; although they all attempt to provide an account of rational individual behavior or aggregation of individual preferences, the exact formulations differ from context to context.
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Independence of irrelevant alternatives Top # 10 Facts
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EC'19: Fundamental Limits of Testing the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives in Discrete Choice
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Small-Hsiao Test for IIA Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Multinomial Logit NLOGIT
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IIA Ice Cream Example
Hausman McFadden Test for IIA Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives Multinomial Logit NLOGIT
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